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1 Introduction
The financing of universal service provision in network industries has tradition-
ally relied on granting the provider a reserved area, for example, in the postal or
telecommunications sectors. The need for alternative funding sources after full
liberalization has increased the interest of regulators and the public in knowing
the cost of universal services. Often, universal service providers (USPs) receive
compensation for fulfilling a universal service obligation (USO). Adjusting con-
sumer prices is an alternative to government funding. While there is quite a
comprehensive literature on the costing of the USO and on price regulation in
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network industries,1 there has been little discussion so far on the effect of the
regulatory environment (e.g. price regulation) on the burden of the USO and
how it should be compensated in this context.
This article explores the two roles of price regulation in financing universal
services: first, price control represents an important aspect of the regulatory
framework, which needs to be taken into account when determining the burden
of the USO. Second, it is a potential instrument to compensate the USP for this
burden. The article thereby adds to the debate about appropriate rules for
compensating and regulating universal services.2 Using a calibrated simulation
model, the article compares different compensation mechanisms for the USP. It
shows that the choice of the compensation mechanism and price regulation has
an impact on the magnitude of the net cost of the USO and needs to be
considered in the determination of the amount to be compensated. This implies
that the policy debate on the financing of the USO must take into account other
aspects of regulation, notably price control.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
current policy issues in financing universal services and the related literature.
Section 3 briefly outlines a quantitative simulation model and its calibration. It
takes the postal sector as a prominent and representative example where the
financing of the USO is currently an important policy issue in light of recent full
market opening and increasing competition from electronic communications
means.3 Section 4 discusses the simulation results; Section 5 concludes with a
summary of the main insights and concrete policy recommendations.
2 Financing of universal service obligations
Calculating the net cost of the USO is currently an important topic in many
network industries. This is especially true for the European postal and
1 See, for example, Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003) for the postal sector and Tardiff and
Taylor (2003) for telecommunications. For example, Laffont and Tirole (1990a, 1990b) discuss
price regulation in multiproduct firms in general. CERP (2009) finds that there is no universal
solution for postal price regulation. Postal regulators have to determine which price regulation
mechanism (or combination of mechanisms) best suits their circumstances and objectives for
their postal market.
2 The article does not weigh in on the current debate about the appropriate scope of the USO.
See Jaag and Dietl (2011) for a discussion of how the USO might be adapted in the future.
3 See, for example, the recent report by Frontier Economics (2013) for the European
Commission.
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telecommunications sectors, because these markets have recently been fully
opened to competition. EU member countries need to implement financing
mechanisms to compensate the USP without granting state aid, which is gen-
erally prohibited by Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. This requires understanding the effect of the USO financing mechanism
on competition. The net cost of the USO according to profitability cost is the
difference in the USP’s profit with and without this obligation.4 A number of
national regulatory authorities have commissioned reports on the net cost of the
postal USO.5 To date, “the majority of NRAs have no established approach, and
there is little precedent” (ERGP, 2011:6). As to telecommunications, the funding
of networks and the inclusion/exclusion of broadband access in the USO pur-
suant to the state aid guidelines are currently important issues in the context of
promoting broadband coverage.6
The costing of universal services has often been analyzed separately from its
financing and irrespective of the regulatory environment. Only recently it has
been argued that the market structure and the burden of the USO are directly
related to other regulations and the funding mechanism in place.7 Jaag et al.
(2011) provide an outline of how changes in the USP’s cost structure affect
pricing, market equilibria and hence indirectly the net cost. They also show
that individual elements of the USO cannot be priced separately, as this would
either result in inconsistent or biased net cost estimates. Boldron et al. (2009)
argue that the effective cost/burden of USO is endogenous to regulation and
funding mechanisms. Similar points are raised in Borsenberger et al. (2010) and
in Jaag and Trinkner (2011) who discuss the appropriate tax base for a sharing
mechanism and the competitive impact of various cost sharing and compensa-
tion mechanisms on the competitive equilibrium, respectively. Jaag (2011a)
discusses the importance of a thorough definition of the counterfactual scenario
4 See Panzar (2000) and Cremer et al. (2000). Annex I of the Third Postal Directive defines the
net cost calculation as follows: “The net cost of universal service obligations is any cost related
to and necessary for the operation of the universal service provision. The net cost of universal
service obligations is to be calculated, as the difference between the net cost for a designated
universal service provider of operating with the universal service obligations and the same
postal service provider operating without the universal service obligations.”
5 See Copenhagen Economics (2008), Bergum (2009), Frontier Economics (2008) and Cohen
et al. (2010) for recent applications of the profitability cost approach in the postal sector. Jaag
et al. (2011) discuss these approaches. The European Committee for Postal Regulation (CERP)
has published guidelines for calculating the net cost of the USO in the EU, see CERP (2008). The
European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP) has issued a draft Report on net cost
calculation and evaluation of a reference scenario, see ERGP (2011).
6 See BEREC (2011) for a discussion of current policy issues in telecommunications in the EU.
7 See Armstrong (2008) for an analysis of access pricing in the context of a USO.
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– whether there is no USO at all or universal services are provided by an
alternative operator – and its impact on the net cost of the USO.
Based on these considerations, it is apparent that merely calculating the net
cost of a USO may not be adequate when devising fair compensation for a USP.8
Consequently, the Third Postal Directive 2008/6/EC in Article 7 states that9:
Where a Member State determines that the universal service obligations […] entail a net
cost […] and represent an unfair financial burden on the universal service provider (s), it
may introduce:
• a mechanism to compensate the undertaking(s) concerned from public funds; or
• a mechanism for the sharing of the net cost of the universal service obligations between
providers of services and/or users.
Hence, a compensation for the USP may only be introduced, if the USO entails a
net cost and represents an unfair burden. In Article 12, the Third Postal Directive
also states that:
Member States shall take steps to ensure that the tariffs for each of the services forming
part of the universal service comply with the following principles:
• prices shall be affordable and must be such that all users, independent of geographical
location, and, in the light of specific national conditions, have access to the services
provided. […],
• prices shall be cost-oriented and give incentives for an efficient universal service provi-
sion. Whenever necessary for reasons relating to the public interest, Member States may
decide that a uniform tariff shall be applied, throughout their national territory and/or
cross-border, to services provided at single piece tariff and to other postal items, […]
Most of the countries in the EU define affordability in their national legislation
(see Okholm et al., 2010). Basic letter and parcel post are the most important
USO products where prices are regulated. All EU countries control prices of basic
letter post. For that purpose, most of the countries use an ex-ante regulation,
meaning that the USP must obtain the approval of the NRA before each price
change. Only three countries (Denmark, Finland and Latvia) use ex-post
approval.
Kleindorfer and Szirmay (2009) argue that liberalization pushes operators to
becomemore customer oriented. However, they observe that pricing continues to be
8 See Jaag (2011b) for a discussion of various notions of an unfair burden.
9 The same rules for compensating the net cost also apply in the telecommunications sector;
see Directive 97/33/EC on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring
universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network
Provision (ONP) and Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive).
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rigorously regulated for universal services, and customer orientation in pricing at
operators with universal service focus has been slow to develop. Ambrosini et al.
(2011) describe the evolution of price regulation in the three postal directives: Article
12 of the First Postal Directive (97/67/EC) stated that pricesmust be affordable, geared
to costs, transparent and non-discriminatory. It also proposed a uniform tariff
throughout the national territory, whereas agreements with individual customers
are possible. The Second Postal Directive (2002/39/EC) clarified the scope of price
regulation, specifying that these prices
shall take into account avoided costs with the standard services covering the complete
range of features offered for the clearance, transport, sorting and delivery of individual
postal items.10
Such pricing linked to avoided costs bound two market segments (single-item and
bulk), which had different demand characteristics (e.g. price elasticity) and therefore
limited the ability for postal operators to compete on a level playing field (see Billette
de Villemeur et al., 2008). The Third Postal Directive relaxed the avoided costs
constraint on pricing; only the preamble now refers to this principle now.
Nevertheless, postal operators’ price setting in all EU countries is restricted at least
for USO products and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future.
3 A model of competition in the postal sector
To illustrate the interaction of the costing of the USO with other regulation and
show the potential of price control for indirect compensation, we use the example
of the postal sector. The model employed for our analysis is based on Jaag and
Trinkner (2011). See Valletti et al. (2002) for a similar analysis. We analyze the
interaction of universal service financing and price regulation after full market
opening, that is, after the abandonment of a reserved area in themarket formail. To
isolate the relevant effects, we use a stylized model keeping things as simple and
illustrative as possible. In particular, we do not model all dimensions of the USO.
We assume that there is one aggregate mail category. Two postal operators
are active in the marketplace: A USP (incumbent) and a competitor (entrant).
The two firms i 2 I;Ef g, each offers postal services which are imperfect sub-
stitutes. There is a continuum 0; 1½   Rþ of different submarkets, where the size
of the total market is of unit size. All submarkets share the same operator-
specific demand and marginal cost characteristics, but differ in fixed costs. We
10 Article 1 of Directive 2002/39/EC, amending article 12 of the 97/67/EC Directive.
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use a geographical interpretation of a submarket, such that submarket r stands
for a local delivery route. Hence, the total market can be divided into segments
by region of delivery. If a firm decides to enter a certain submarket r, it has to
pay the incremental cost associated with that submarket f rð Þ, where we assume
that f 0 rð Þ>0.11 For the sake of simplicity, we make the following further
assumptions:
Assumption 1: Submarkets are independent of each other. This implies that the
competitive situation in one submarket does not affect the cost structure or
demand in another market.
Assumption 2: The two operators I (incumbent) and E (entrant) possess similar
technologies (cost structure) and compete in horizontally differentiated
products.
Assumption 3: The sequence of decisions is as follows: First, a profit-maximiz-
ing incumbent chooses its optimum market coverage (geographical area cover-
age). Second, an entrant (competitor) sets its optimum coverage. Third, both
operators set their price(s) for each of the submarkets. If there is a USO, the
incumbent’s market coverage is exogenously set to 1 (full coverage).
Assumption 4: Only letter mail is considered; the USO consists of a daily and
nationwide mail delivery.12
Assumption 5: Marginal cost ci is constant.
In every submarket r each operator makes a gross profit (or surplus) amounting
to si rð Þ. Because all submarkets share the same demand characteristics and
variable costs, the equilibrium prices in each submarket and therefore also s
depend only on the number of competitors.13 Typically, in the postal sector,
si 0ð Þ  fi 0ð Þ > 0;while si 1ð Þ  fi 1ð Þ < 0: This implies that some submarkets
(regions) are attractive to serve while others are not, and market entry will
generally occur, albeit not with full coverage.
11 We refer to the incremental cost associated with serving a market as “incremental coverage
cost” in the sense that it is the cost incurred when an operator extends its regional presence
incrementally.
12 There is no general uniform pricing and affordability constraint in the model. In many
countries, there are USO products which have to be delivered nationwide but are not subject
to a uniformity or affordability constraint (e.g. bulk mail). We discuss scenarios with and
without uniform pricing constraints to compare the respective competitive effects.
13 There is no reason for price differentiation within markets if the number of operators is
same, because marginal costs do not vary across regions.
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From the perspective of operators, submarkets are ranked by increasing
order of cost. Without USO, operators begin to cover the most densely populated
areas and continue to cover less densely areas as long as it is profitable. Hence,
each operator starts offering services from the submarket with the highest profit
and leaves no gaps between served submarkets. If operator i serves all submar-
kets 0; ri½ ; its total profit will be
πi ¼
ðri
0
si rð Þ  fiðrÞdr: ½1
Given the sequence of decisions as in Assumption 3, the model is solved back-
ward. First, the equilibrium in the price setting stage is determined in scenarios with
and without price regulation. Then, the firms decide on their market coverage.
The operators’ surpluses result from price competition in the continuum of
submarkets. Price competition is driven by the users’ demand for mail. Note that
the incremental producer’s surplus depends on the number of active firms, that
is, whether the submarket is monopolistic or duopolistic. This is due to mutual
business stealing (quantity effect) and competitive pressure on prices (price
effect) in the duopolistic regions. We assume that there is one representative
sender sending mail to destination region r having quasilinear preferences with
respect to money. It cares about mail conveyed by the two firms I (incumbent)
and E (entrant). Total utility u for mail sent to region r is
ur qr;mð Þ ¼ mþ αIqrI 
β
2γ
qrI
 2 þ αEqrE  β2γ qrE
 2 " β
γ
qrIq
r
E; ½2
where qri is the quantity of mail sent to region r via operator i andm is the amount of
money spent on other goods. The last term reflects the fact that the services offered by
the two operators are not perfect substitutes but rather differentiated products. The
higher the degree of differentiation, the closer parameter " is to zero. Parameter β
determines the market size and the slope of the demand curve. The difference
between αI and αE is due to differences in delivery speed and reliability. Note that
utility as described above primarily represents the representative sender’s prefer-
ences toward mail. However, demand for mail is also determined by the receivers’
preferences. This is taken care of by parameter γ. A receiver’s likeliness to causemail
depends onwhether mail is delivered to the doorstep or needs to be picked up in a P.
O. box.14 Hence, the mode of delivery determines the value of γ:
14 Transactional mail is often originated by recipients who choose to have a mail item delivered by
the post instead of electronic alternatives. The importance of doorstep delivery for these customers is
empirically demonstrated, for example, by Friedli et al. (2006). Due to the recipients’preferences, also
senders of direct mail highly value doorstep delivery compared with P.O. box delivery.
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γ ¼ 1 withdoorstepdelivery;
<1 withoutdoorstepdelivery:

½3
All households which are not served with doorstep delivery by the incum-
bent are assumed to still receive mail in a P.O. box.
By computing the first-order conditions of the Lagrange function associated
with the utility maximization problem and solving the resulting equation sys-
tem, we obtain the linear demand functions for the two operators’ products
qrI p
r
I ; p
r
E
  ¼ γ
β 1 "2ð Þ αI  "αE  p
r
I þ "prE
 
; ½4
qrE p
r
E; p
r
I
  ¼ γ
β 1 "2ð Þ αE  "αI  p
r
E þ "prI
 
: ½5
The two operators’ gross profit (producer surplus) functions in region r write as
srI ¼ prI  cI  μI
 
qrI p
r
I ; p
r
E
 
; ½6
srE ¼ prE  cE  μE
 
qrE p
r
I ; p
r
E
 
: ½7
Parameters μI and μE are the contribution rates needed to finance the net
cost of the USO, in case there is a compensation fund.
3.1 Price setting without regulation
If there is no price regulation, the two operators’ producer surplus maximiza-
tion with respect to prices results in the two reaction functions15:
prI ¼
1
2 αI þ cI þ μIð Þ if r >~r;
1
2 αI  "αE þ cI þ μI þ "prE
 
if r<~r;
8<
: ½8
prE ¼
1
2
αE  "αI þ cE þ μE þ "prI
 
: ½9
15 In the past, the postal USO generally called for uniform prices. With increased liberalization,
this obligation has been relaxed in many countries. The Third Postal Directive even requires
that any uniform tariff obligation be limited to single-piece items (mainly stamps and franked
mail). Hence, the assumption of differentiated prices is plausible in the postal sector. Many
postal operators effectively differentiate prices across geographical areas in their rebate system
for large mailers.
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The differentiation of two cases results from the market being divided into a
monopolistic region and a duopolistic region according to the market coverage
decisions. Solving the reaction functions results in the following expressions for
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s prices:
pr >~rI ¼
1
2
αI þ cI þ μIð Þ; ½10
pr<~rI ¼
αI  "αI2  "αE þ
"αE
2
þ cI þ μI þ "cE þ "μE
2 "
2
2
; ½11
pE ¼
αE  "αE2  "αI þ
"αI
2
þ cE þ μE þ "cI þ "μI
2 "
2
2
: ½12
These prices and the associated quantities determine each operator’s sur-
plus in all regions r.
3.2 Price setting with regulation
As discussed above, prices for postal products are often regulated. We,
therefore, study scenarios with and without regulated prices. In the scenarios
with price regulation, we first assume that prices are set uniformly over all
markets such that the USP would just break even in the scenario without
USO. Then, prices are frozen at that level also in the scenario with USO, and
the USP is compensated by external funds or a compensation fund. An
alternative means of financing the USO includes adjusting prices in the
USO case such that the USP’s profit remains unchanged compared to the
situation without USO.
All regulated price levels cannot be determined algebraically. In the simula-
tions below, they will be computed numerically.
3.3 Optimum area coverage
The incremental benefit of serving an additional market is given by the producer
surplus which results from the price setting stage. The operators’ incremental
coverage cost fiðrÞ is the first derivate of the total fixed cost Fi rð Þ associated with
serving all regions up to r:
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Fi rð Þ ¼ Ci þ δirθi : ½13
The first part of total cost is fixed cost Ci, which is independent of quantities
and the area covered by the operators. The second part reflects the time cost of
delivery which increases convexly in the area covered according to the calibra-
tion of the parameters δ and θ. Hence, the two operators’ profits are
πI ¼ πI rð Þ ¼ ~rs
r
I þ r  ~rð Þsr
0
I  FI rð Þ if there is no USO;
πI 1ð Þ ¼ ~rsrI þ 1 ~rð Þsr
0
I  FI 1ð Þ þ T if there is a USO;

½14
πE ¼ ~rsrE  FE ~rð Þ: ½15
The last part of the incumbent’s profit function with USO, T, reflects the
transfer received as a compensation for providing universal services.
The optimum market coverage of the entrant and the incumbent are,
respectively,
~r ¼ argmaxrE
ðrE
0
sE rð Þ  fE rð Þdr; ½16
r ¼ argmaxr1
ðrI
0
sI rð Þ  fI rð Þdr: ½17
Due to the assumptions made, total cost is convex. This implies that only
one type of asymmetric equilibrium can arise in which one operator is bigger
than the other. Here, due to the sequence in Assumption 3, the entrant’s cover-
age, ~r; is lower than the incumbent’s, r.16 This is due to the incremental surplus
in the monopolistic segment being larger than in the duopolistic segment: there
is a mutual business stealing (quantity effect) and competitive pressure on
prices in the duopoly region (price effect) such that
sri ; si r<~rð Þ< sr
0
i ; si r  ~rð Þ: ½18
Hence, in the absence of a USO, the specific cost structure together with the
market penetration decisions results in a natural segmentation of the entire
market into three regions (see Figure 1):
16 In our model, it is the sequence of decisions that results in the incumbent always serving at
equilibrium a larger proportion of the market. This sequence reflects that the incumbent
operator has traditionally been serving all markets due to the USO.
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(1) In attractive markets (e.g. densely populated delivery areas), it is feasible
for both companies to operate in parallel (“competitive region”, r<~r).
(2) In less attractive local delivery markets (e.g. semi-rural areas), an operator
can make a profit only if there is no competitor. Hence, there will be a
monopolistic operator in equilibrium (“monopolistic region”, ~r< r<r).
(3) In the least attractive local delivery markets (e.g. rural areas), incremental
coverage costs are higher than incremental surplus, such that no operator
serves this segment voluntarily (“unserved region”, r >r). It is assumed that
all regions r >r are served with P.O. box delivery by the incumbent.
The introduction of a USO forces the USP to upgrade to home delivery in areas
r >r in which the incremental coverage cost exceeds the incremental surplus from
extending market coverage. This replaces the operator’s coverage decision in the
sequence of decisions and potentially necessitates some kind of compensation.
The regulatory authority anticipates the resulting market equilibrium and intro-
duces a compensation mechanism before the operators decision on their market
coverage and pricing. Hence, from the operators’ perspective, the contribution
rates are predetermined. Also, the USP’s compensation is determined ex ante and
not dependent ex post on the funds actually collected.17
Given the incumbent’s coverage, the optimum degree ~r of the entrant’s
market penetration is
Incremental coverage cost
0% r˜ r¯ 100%
Incremental surplus
(Several operators)
Incremental surplus
(Single operator)
Market coverage
Figure 1: A network industry without USO
Source: Jaag and Trinkner (2011).
17 Since the model is deterministic and there are no information asymmetries, the contributions
to the fund just match the predetermined compensation.
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~r ¼
0 if sE 0ð Þ<0;
1 if sE 1ð Þ > δEθ;
srE
θδE
  1
θ1
otherwise;
8><
>:
½19
where srE is the entrant’s surplus in the duopolistic market segments. In analogy,
without an USO, the incumbent penetrates the market to the degree
r ¼
0 if sI 0ð Þ<0;
1 if sI 1ð Þ > δIθ;
sr
0
I
θδI
  1
θ1
otherwise;
8><
>:
½20
where sr
0
I is the incumbent’s surplus in the monopolistic market segments.
3.4 Welfare
Total welfare can be computed as the sum of the operators’ profits (excluding
government transfers) and consumer surplus18:
W ¼ πI þ πE  Text þ
ðr
0
ur  qrIprI  qrEprEdr: ½21
3.5 Financing mechanisms
Parameters μI and μE (contribution rates) in eqs [10–12] allow to introduce
various financing mechanisms. Oxera (2007) provides an overview of financing
instruments. Articles 7 and 9 of the Third Postal Directive guide the member
states when implementing mechanisms to share the net cost of the USO.
Especially, the provisions aim at preventing member states from raising new
barriers to entry. The main funding mechanisms compliant with the Third Postal
Directive are external financing and a compensation fund to which postal
operators are obliged to contribute to. These contributions might be waived if
an operator provides universal services (“pay-or-play”). If the burden of the USO
can be absorbed by price adjustments, there may be no need for further
compensation.
18 For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no shadow cost of public funds.
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In the EU, many member states have provisions for one or several financing
mechanisms for the USO. The following countries may use external financing
(direct state subsidies), if the USO turns out to be an unfair burden: Estonia,
Latvia, Slovenia, Norway and Sweden.19 Eleven countries have provisions for a
compensation fund, but so far no country has activated this fund: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovenia and Spain. Finland used to have a version of pay-or-play.20 Under
this scheme, the “pay” element entails postal service providers without USO
having to pay a fee to the tax office. The fee applies to new entrants with a
restricted license to provide postal services in areas where the population
density is above a certain threshold. If the operator decides to play, that is, to
offer universal services, it will not be obliged to pay a fee and will be entitled to
receive government funds.
In Switzerland, there is still a reserved area for letter mail up to 50 g. Hence,
Swiss Post enjoys some market power in this segment. It has to finance to cost of
the USO entirely from its own receipts without any other compensation. Under
the new postal legislation entered into force in fall 2012, there is a link to price
regulation ensuring that regulated prices reflect the contribution of the respec-
tive revenue to the financing of the USO. The USO is, thus, financed by allowed
price adjustments for the USP.
In the following, we consider four potential funding mechanisms to com-
pensate the USP which reflect to mechanisms observed in practice:
3.5.1 External financing
With external financing, there is a direct subsidy from government funds. In this
mechanism, there is no tax in the industry, and the net cost is reimbursed by the
government directly:
μI ¼ μE ¼ 0 ½22
Text such that πI rð Þ ¼ πI 1ð Þ ½23
where Text is a direct subsidy from government funds.
19 See Copenhagen Economics (2010) for an overview.
20 These license requirements are inconsistent with the Third Postal Directive as competing
postal companies other than the universal service provider cannot be required to deliver mail 5
days per week.
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3.5.2 Everyone contributes
In case everyone contributes, there is a Universal Service Fund with no distinc-
tion between the USP and the entrant who both pay a contribution to the fund
on a per-item basis21:
μI ¼ μE: ½24
Consequently, there is no distinction between the USP and the entrant who
both pay a contribution at rate μ. If the net cost is determined before compensa-
tion (“sequential approach”), πi 1ð Þis first calculated with μI ¼ 0; μE ¼ 0. The
fund’s budget restriction is satisfied if
T ¼ μ  qr>~rI 1 ~rð Þ þ qr<~rI ~r þ qE~r
 
: ½25
The model is then solved numerically for μ ¼ μI ¼ μE such that πI rð Þ ¼ πI 1ð Þ.
3.5.3 Pay-or-play
In a pay-or-play system, only the entrant (non-USP) contributes to the fund. The
USP is waived from the tax in the sense that the incumbent provides universal
services (and does not contribute to the fund) and the entrant contributes to the
fund (but does not provide universal services). In our model specification and
calibration, it is actually optimal for the entrant not to offer universal services
himself but rather to contribute to the fund.22
μI ¼ 0: ½26
Again, if the net cost is determined before compensation (“sequential
approach”), πI 1ð Þ is first calculated using μI ¼ 0; μE ¼ 0. In this third model, the
USP is waived from the output tax. The fund’s budget restriction is satisfied if
T ¼ μE  qE~r½ : ½27
The model is then solved numerically for μE such that πI rð Þ ¼ πI 1ð Þ.
21 The Third Postal Directive does not impose a specific tax base for the compensation fund.
The tax could also be based on profit, turnover or other variables (see, e.g. Gautier and Paolini,
2011, or Jaag and Trinkner, 2011).
22 In practice, the difficulty with a “pay-or-play” system is to define the balance between
the provision of universal services and the reduction of the contribution to the fund. Here, we
simplify by not differentiating between various degrees of universal service provision. Given the
choice between providing full USO (together with the incumbent) and none, it is optimal for
the entrant to “pay” and not to “play” in all scenarios discussed below.
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3.5.4 Price adjustment
With allowed price adjustments, the USP’s “compensation” consists of the
allowance to adjust its prices such that it breaks even both in the USO and in
the non-USO scenarios:
pI such that πI rð Þ ¼ πI 1ð Þ ¼ 0 ½28
Hence, there is no net cost and, therefore, no need for further compensation.
This financing mechanism makes only sense, if there is price regulation. It is
assumed that the USP enjoys a certain degree of market power23 and that there is
price control in terms of a uniform pricing and affordability constraint.
The different financing mechanisms for universal services yield the follow-
ing direct and indirect effects on competition:
(1) A mechanism for compensating the incumbent providing universal services
based on external funds has no effects on the market equilibrium.24
(2) With a financing of the USO by means of fund to which every operator
contributes to, the incumbent’s and the entrant’s incremental surplus is
reduced in all served submarkets. Intuitively, the compensation has a
direct and an indirect effect on the USP’s profit and hence on the net
cost: The direct impact is that the USP contributes itself, such that the
net compensation it receives is reduced. The indirect effect is that the
competitor reduces its market coverage, which increases the USP’s profit
because his monopolistic market segment is extended.
(3) With a financing mechanism to which the incumbent does not contri-
bute to, again the entrant serves a smaller region because of its con-
tribution and its reduced incremental surplus. Due to the asymmetric
taxation in the competitive region, the USP’s incremental surplus
increases in this region. Because the USP is exempt, all revenues in
the submarkets r > ~rpop are unaffected. Hence, in contrast to the
mechanism in which everyone contributes, the producer’s surplus in
these regions does not change. In all regions r where ~rpop < r<~rext, the
USP is also exempt from contributing. In these regions, the USP is now
the sole operator and earns a higher surplus in that submarket com-
pared with the external funding scenario.
23 Hence, it is assumed that demand supports prices such that USP is able to break even.
24 Recall that the specification exhibits no cross-side effects between regions on the demand or
cost side.
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(4) With price adjustments, the USP finances the USO itself by increasing its
prices. This decreases its competitiveness and results in lost market share.
It also invites the competitor to enter in additional submarkets.
3.6 Model calibration
The model is calibrated with data from Swiss Post in 2007 (see Jaag, 2007, and
Jaag and Trinkner, 2011). In Switzerland, there was a reserved area up to 100 g at
that time. Hence, the key parameters are calibrated for a partial monopoly
version of the above model. There were mainly competitors in the market for
unaddressed mail and newspapers. The data in Table 1 are the empirical basis
for the calibration in Table 2. It includes addressed mail, unaddressed mail and
newspapers.
Volume, revenue and average price data stem from Swiss Post’s annual
report. In terms of price elasticity of overall letter mail demand, Trinkner and
Table 1: Empirical basis for the model
Total volume 5’117 million items
Total revenue 3’070 million CHF
Average price 0.60 CHF
Total variable cost 45% of total cost
Time cost of delivery 30% of total fixed cost
Price elasticity of demand η –0.8
Table 2: Key model parameters
β ¼ 1=η pI=qI 1.47  10−10 Market size parameter
αI ¼ βqI þ pI 1.35 Preference for incumbent quality
αE 1.05 Preference for entrant quality
δI 3.75  106 Incumbent’s coverage-dependent delivery cost
δE 2.00  106 Entrant’s coverage-dependent delivery cost
cI 0.3 Incumbent’s marginal cost
cE 0.25 Entrant’s marginal cost
γ 1 Relative preference for doorstep delivery
γ 0.64 Relative preference for P.O. box delivery
" 0.70 Degree of product differentiation
θ 2.70 Convexity of coverage cost function
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Grossmann (2006) find in their empirical study for Switzerland a long-run price
elasticity between –0.22 and –0.27. From his survey of studies, Robinson
(2007) finds that price elasticity measures for mail products typically range
between –0.2 and –0.8 (see also Fève et al., 2006, for a recent study on mail
price elasticities). In a similar exercise as ours, D’Alcantara and Amerlynck
(2006) choose a value of –0.3; Dietl et al. (2005) use values between –0.3 and
–0.5 for different mail products. Since we expect price elasticity to further
increase over time, we choose a value for price elasticity of demand in the
high range of these estimates.
From the values in Table 1 and additional data obtained from Swiss Post, the
model parameters are calibrated as follows:
We assume an entrant with a slightly different business model than the
incumbent’s. Based on evidence from Sweden and Denmark (Bring Citymail), the
Netherlands (Sandd), Switzerland (Quickmail) and other liberalized markets, we
assume that the entrant chooses to deliver less frequently than the incumbent
does and is able to pay the employees lower wages than the incumbent. Hence,
we assume lower fixed and marginal costs. On the other hand, we calibrate
demand such that more consumers choose the incumbent when both operators
offer at the same price.
Without USO, the incumbent’s optimum market coverage r is at 79%, and
the entrant’s coverage is at 64%. In the absence of price regulation, the USP’s
price in the monopolistic and competitive market segment is 0.825 and 0.591,
respectively. The entrant’s price is 0.387.
4 Simulation results
The model does not allow for closed-form results on the competitive effects of
the difference financing mechanisms and the role of price regulation.
Therefore, this section presents three numerical simulations based on the
calibrated model and discusses the effect of the USO financing on prices,
profits and welfare:
(1) In the first simulation, there is no price regulation. The effects of external,
everyone pays and pay-or-play financing mechanisms on competition are
calculated independently of the net cost calculations (“sequential
approach”).
(2) In the second simulation, there is no price regulation, but the competitive
effect of the financing mechanisms is taken into account when determining
the net cost (“integrated approach”).
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(3) In the third simulation, there is a uniform pricing and affordability con-
straint. The competitive effect of the financing mechanisms is taken into
account when determining the net cost.
4.1 Sequential approach without price regulation
In the first scenario, there is no price regulation. The USP’s compensation is
determined independently of how it is financed. This implies that the competi-
tive effects of financing the USO are not taken into account when calculating the
net cost. The contribution rates are determined to cover the calculated difference
in the USP’s profits without USO and with USO but before compensation and its
contribution.
Table 3 shows the simulation results. The actual (gross) compensation
received by the USP is normalized for comparison across tables. It is the same
with all financing mechanisms, because it is determined independently of them.
With external financing, the net cost is compensated such that the USP’s profit
change due to the USO is equal to zero, see eq. [23]. In the everyone pays
scenario, both operators’ profits decrease, because they contribute to the finan-
cing of the USO based on the rule in eq. [25]. Compared to external financing,
welfare decreases due to the distortions caused by the contribution rates. The
Table 3: Model results without price regulation: sequential calculation
Financing mechanism
External Everyone pays Pay-or-play
Compensation* 1.92% 1.92% 1.92%
Per-unit contribution incumbent 0.000 0.007 0.000
Per-unit contribution entrant 0.000 0.007 0.039
Entrant market coverage 64% 63% 55%
Incumbent consumer price pr >~rI 0.825 0.829 0.825
Incumbent consumer price pr<~rI 0.591 0.597 0.599
Entrant consumer price pE 0.387 0.392 0.409
USP profit change*** 0.00% –0.59% 5.67%
Entrant profit change*** 0.00% –0.10% –0.93%
Welfare change** 0.00% –0.69% –1.30%
Notes: * Relative to welfare with external financing, scenario without price regulation; **relative
to scenario with external financing, without price regulation and ***compared to non-USO case;
normalized by overall welfare in the non-USO case.
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same effects apply also – and even stronger – in the pay-or-play scenario where
the compensation is calculated as in eq. [27]. There, USP profits from the USO
and its compensation with a profit increase compared to the non-USO case by
5.67%. This is due to the high per-unit contribution which reduces the entrant’s
competitiveness and market coverage (from 64% without USO to 55% with
USO). Hence, the monopolistic region is extended compared to a situation
without USO.
To summarize, without price regulation and with a pay-or-play mechanism,
the market is distorted in the USP’s favor, because market entry is obstructed
due to a high burden on the competitor. The opposite is true in the case in which
also the USP contributes to the financing of the USO.
4.2 Integrated approach without price regulation
Table 4 shows the results of the same simulations as in Table 3 with one
difference: The contribution rate is now determined such that the USP profit
after compensation and taxation is unchanged compared to a scenario without
universal service (“integrated approach”).25 Hence, the net cost is computed in
Table 4: Model results without price regulation: integrated calculation
Financing mechanism
External Everyone pays Pay-or-play
Compensation* 1.92% 2.79% 0.55%
Per-unit contribution incumbent 0.000 0.010 0.000
Per-unit contribution entrant 0.000 0.010 0.009
Entrant market coverage 64% 63% 62%
Incumbent consumer price pr>~rI 0.825 0.830 0.825
Incumbent consumer price pr<~rI 0.591 0.599 0.593
Entrant consumer price pE 0.387 0.395 0.392
USP profit change*** 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Entrant profit change*** 0.00% –0.15% –0.24%
Welfare change** 0.00% –1.01% –0.24%
Notes: * Relative to welfare with external financing, scenario without price regulation; **relative
to scenario with external financing, without price regulation and ***compared to non-USO case;
normalized by overall welfare in the non-USO case.
25 See Jaag and Trinkner (2011).
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market equilibrium simultaneously with the necessary contributions as in eqs
[23], [25] and [27].
When a tax is introduced to finance the USO, not only the profit/deficit in
the unserved region grows or shrinks, but there are also profit variations in the
other regions which are taken into account in the integrated approach. Hence,
changes in the USP’s profit cannot occur by definition.
A comparison of Table 4 with Table 3 shows that the scenarios with external
funding are the same: The competitive equilibrium is not affected by this kind of
financing. The two scenarios with a fund differ, because the contributions to the
fund are collected on a per-item basis while compensation is lump sum. Hence,
the operators’ pricing decisions are affected by the financing mechanism. If
everyone pays, the contribution rate has two opposing effects. First, it compen-
sates the USP for the net costs. Second, it raises the net cost as the tax is levied
on the USP as well which creates an additional need for compensation. This
necessitates higher tax rates for full compensation in equilibrium compared to
the pay-or-play scenario. Moreover, the USP increases its prices due to the tax
burden resulting from contributing to the funding of the USO. Direct compensa-
tion (first row) is lower in the pay-or-play case, because the entrant’s optimum
coverage is lower which represents a partial compensation for the USP since it
extends its monopolistic region. This also results in a lower entrant profit and
overall welfare.
The simulations show that it does not suffice to just calculate the deficit of
the unprofitable products: As the financing affects also profitable products,
these cannot be ignored in the costing of the USO. Compared to a sequential
calculation of the USO net cost, an integrated calculation and compensation
guarantees that there is no over- or undercompensation of the USP.
4.3 Integrated approach with price regulation
With price regulation in place, the USP’s price is uniform and regulated such
that it would break even without USO, see eq. [28].26 The results differ quite
strongly to those without price regulation (see Table 5).27 The first three columns
show the situations with the same financing mechanisms and calculation
method as in Table 4. The last column shows the result, if prices are such that
26 This setting is typical for the postal sector in many countries where prices are subject to
direct approval (e.g. in Switzerland) or price cap regulation.
27 We assume that only the USP’s prices are regulated, not the entrant’s.
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the USP just breaks even with USO.28 It would not make sense to combine a
break-even constraint with another financing mechanism, because the net cost
is equal to zero by definition. With all four financing mechanisms, price control
results in a price decrease in both the monopolistic and the competitive region
due to the incumbent’s strong market power. There are strong welfare gains
compared to the scenarios without price regulation.
Compared to the results in the three first columns in Table 4 without price
regulation, compensation is higher with price regulation, because no price
adjustment is allowed. This price freeze also results in the two scenarios with
a fund being equivalent. The only difference is the USP receiving a high com-
pensation in the case that everyone pays to offset its own contribution (first
row). The USP’s low prices and the high contribution rates in all scenarios keep
the entrant mostly out of the market.
If the USP is allowed to adjust prices to break even (fourth column), prices
increase because no other means of financing the USO are available. This
increases the entrant’s profit compared to the other scenarios due to the increase
in its net-of-tax prices. Moreover, the USP’s opportunity to compensate the net
cost of the USO by increasing its price releases the competitor from contributing
Table 5: Model results with price regulation: integrated calculation
Financing mechanism
External Everyone pays Pay-or-play Price adj.
Compensation* 7.22% 52.08% 0.46% 0.00%
Per-unit contribution incumbent 0.000 0.166 0.000 0.000
Per-unit contribution entrant 0.000 0.166 0.166 0.000
Entrant market coverage 52% 12% 12% 67%
Incumbent consumer price pr >~rI 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.610
Incumbent consumer price pr<~rI 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.610
Entrant consumer price pE 0.365 0.448 0.448 0.394
USP profit change*** 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Entrant profit change*** −1.00% −2.35% −2.35% 0.79%
Welfare change** 22.37% 25.49% 25.49% 13.09%
Notes: * Relative to welfare with external financing, scenario without price regulation;
** Relative to scenario with external financing, without price regulation; and *** Compared to
non-USO case; normalized by overall welfare in the non-USO case.
28 The model calibration allows the market that actually supports such an equilibrium.
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to its financing. However, compared to other financing mechanisms (with price
regulation), it degrades welfare, because it invites inefficient entry.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
The market equilibrium in all scenarios is driven by the entrant’s market cover-
age decision which itself depends on the incumbent’s pricing. A sensitivity
analysis analyzes these effects in more detail. It bases on the last set of simula-
tions which assume that prices are regulated to be uniform such that the
incumbent breaks even. Table 6 reports the values for the incumbent’s regulated
price in equilibrium depending on the price elasticity of demand (η) and the
degree of (exogenous) product differentiation ("). Recall that the higher the
degree of differentiation, the closer parameter " is to zero. Table 7 shows the
competitor’s coverage with the same set of parameter values for the price
elasticity of demand and the degree of product differentiation.
With low price elasticities of demand, a high degree of product differentia-
tion implies a high USP price to break even (Table 6). This is due to the
competitor’s increased market coverage (Table 7). With high price elasticities,
this effect is reversed. While the competitor’s market coverage still increases in
the degree of product differentiation, its pricing is now more aggressive (and
applies in more regions), hence forcing also the incumbent to set its prices low.
Table 6: Incumbent’s consumer price depending on product differentiation and price elasticity
of demand
η ¼ 0:74 η ¼ 0:76 η ¼ 0:78 η ¼ 0:80
" ¼ 0:64 0.800 0.766 0.729 0.608
" ¼ 0:66 0.791 0.757 0.720 0.608
" ¼ 0:68 0.783 0.749 0.711 0.609
" ¼ 0:70 0.775 0.740 0.703 0.610
Table 7: Competitor’s coverage depending on product differentiation and price elasticity of
demand
η ¼ 0.74 η ¼ 0.76 η ¼ 0.78 η ¼ 0.80
" ¼ 0.64 91% 90% 89% 73%
" ¼ 0.66 89% 88% 86% 71%
" ¼ 0.68 86% 85% 83% 69%
" ¼ 0.70 84% 83% 80% 67%
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The more elastic demand, the lower is the USP’s equilibrium price. This
reduces the competitor’s profitability and results in its lower market coverage.
5 Conclusions
Universal services in network industries impose a net cost on designated opera-
tors. There is currently some diversity in practice to compensate operators
offering universal services. An important policy challenge is to design the
compensation for the USO such that it is competitively neutral.
This article shows that the net cost of USO – defined as the difference in the
USP’s profit with and without USO – very much depends on the design of the
compensation mechanism. If the USP is compensated from the general govern-
ment budget, this does not affect the market equilibrium. In this case, USO costing
and financing are independent of each other. However, if there is a tax levied from
the operators in the market in order to finance the USO, this distorts the market
equilibrium and has to be taken into account when determining the net cost.
Given the complex interaction between the costing and financing of the USO
and the USP’s price regulation, an integrated approach to USO costing and
financing should, therefore, be applied. This implies that the regulatory author-
ity set the contribution rate or its price control in a way that the USP’s profits
remain unchanged comparing a situation without USO and one with USO after
compensation. If this is not done, the USP may be significantly over- or under-
compensated. Simulations show that a compensation fund to which all opera-
tors (including the USP) contribute according to their market shares results in an
undercompensation of the USP. In contrast, if the USP is excluded from con-
tributions, this will unambiguously result in over-compensation and contribu-
tion rates act as an effective barrier to entry for potential competitors.
If the USP enjoys a certain market power, its prices are likely to be regulated
within or in addition to the USO, which results in restricted profit opportunities.
Compensation for universal service provision works in the opposite direction by
replicating the USP’s hypothetical profit without USO. Both regulatory interven-
tions affect each other’s rationale and effect. Allowing the USP to adjust its
prices to compensate for the burden of the USO and as a substitute for direct
compensation is a straightforward approach to financing the USO and a viable
alternative to funds from government or a compensation fund. It also reduces
regulatory complexity and is pro-competitive, since it strengthens the competitor
by releasing it from contributing to financing the USO and allowing it to increase
its market coverage profitably due to USP’s increased prices. However, it
degrades overall welfare due to inefficient entry.
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